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Abstract
Over the past ten years there has been increasing public concern regarding the rising costs of
pharmaceuticals. Drug expenditure is the fastest growing sector of healthcare costs in the United
States. The structure of the U.S. healthcare system allows pharmaceutical companies to freely
price their drugs. Then payers decide whether and how to cover these drugs. Payers have at their
disposal several utilization management tools, such as tiering and prior authorizations, to steer
their members to less costly drugs. However, the ability of payers to implement these tools varies
significantly depending on whether the drug is covered under the pharmaceutical benefit /
Medicare Part D provisions of healthcare plans or the medical benefit / Medicare Part B
provisions. Drugs covered under the pharmaceutical benefit / Part D are distributed via retail
pharmacies and, in general, are oral pills. Drugs covered under the medical benefit / Part B are
physician administered drugs and, in general, are injectables or intravenous drugs.
As pharmaceutical companies increasingly price their drugs at higher and higher levels, payers
must take a drug's pricing into account when determining how to cover these drugs. This thesis
assesses the role pricing plays in how a drug is covered. Two different classes of drugs were
chosen to examine this topic: fixed dose combination (FDC) cardiovascular drugs and
intravenous oncologics. FDC cardiovascular drugs were chosen because they are covered under
the pharmacy benefit / Part D and are considered to have questionable efficacious value over
their individual drug components. Intravenous oncologics were chosen because they are covered
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under the medical benefit / Part B and represent a highly politicized therapy area. These two
therapy areas are illustrative of strongly contrasting classes of drugs.
Literature review and public sources were used to obtain prices for the select cardiovascular
FDCs and oncologics. Medicare's Formulary Finder was used to obtain the coverage level for
the cardiovascular FDCs. This preliminary information showed that the most expensive of the
select FDCs, Caduet, has the worst coverage. The literature review suggested that Provenge and
Avastin, the most expensive of the select oncologics, had difficulty obtaining coverage. To
confirm these results, interviews were conducted with a variety of payers. These interviews
focused on what factors went into the coverage decision-making process for cardiovascular
FDCs and intravenous oncologics. Interviews were also conducted with an oncologic distributor
to determine distributors' impact on price.
We hypothesized that price was the driving reason for Caduet's, Provenge's, and Avastin's
relatively poor coverage. However, our hypothesis was not entirely confirmed. Payers confirmed
that price and contracting were the driving factors for Caduet's relatively poor coverage, but they
indicated that the situation was not as simple for the intravenous oncologics. Although price does
play a small role in the coverage decision-making process for intravenous oncologics, other
factors such as public policies and the unmet need in the therapy area drive coverage decisions
more than price. Additionally, payers indicated that they lack the ability to steer members to less
costly intravenous oncologics due to the drug acquisition and reimbursement structure of the
medical benefit. Consequently, payers are beginning to utilize new techniques such as specialty
pharmacies to help control utilization of these products. Also, other organizations such as certain
oncologic distributors are attempting to implement cost-effective guidelines for intravenous
oncologics. Our results have significant implications for what pharmaceutical companies should
be considering when pricing their drugs, and highlight the pricing and coverage issues in the
current healthcare system's structure that payers and other organizations are facing.
Thesis Supervisor: T. (Teo) Forcht Dagi, MD, MPH, MBA, FAANS, FACS, FCCM
Thesis Supervisor: Regina Herzlinger, PhD
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The increasingly high prices of pharmaceuticals have generated significant public criticism in
recent years. When Dendreon introduced its prostate cancer drug Provenge with a $93,000 price
tag, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) initiated a national coverage review just
two months after the drug's launch. Genentech established a $55,000 price cap on its drug
Avastin after the public outcry over its $100,000 annual cost for non-small cell lung cancer
patients.
Typically, the health insurance companies, i.e., the primary payers in the employment-based
healthcare system in the U.S., are the ones who reign in these prices. In their attempts to control
drug costs, these payers have developed several techniques over the years to direct member drug
utilization to the least expensive options. However, there are significant differences in how
payers are able to manage drugs dispensed by a retail pharmacy versus drugs administered by
physicians and/or nurses in an outpatient setting. These differences allow payers to have greater
management control over drugs administered at the retail pharmacy level.
Payers' drug utilization management techniques are continuing to evolve and include tiered
formularies, step edits, prior authorizations, and quantity limits. These techniques have received
academic attention and exploration, but little seems to be known about what factors go into a
payer's management decision-making process when evaluating a new drug. Are decisions based
primarily on efficacy? How much of a role does the price of a drug play in the process? How
does this differ by class of products? To explore these issues further, we chose a set of drugs
from two therapy areas to examine why payers made the decisions they made in terms of
covering and managing these drugs.
The first class of drugs chosen was fixed dosed combination drugs (FDCs) indicated for the
prevention of cardiovascular disease, specifically Caduet, Vytorin, and Exforge. All of these
drugs are a combination of two drugs currently on the market, one of which is generic. They are
distributed via retail pharmacies and have questionable added value considering their
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components are already commercially available. Thus, we believe they are an ideal class of drugs
for payers to strongly manage for cost control purposes.
In contrast, the second class of drugs we chose is more difficult to manage. The second class of
drugs chosen was intravenous oncology drugs (IV oncologics), specifically Provenge, Avastin,
Erbitux, and Vectibix. These drugs are all administered at either physicians' offices or infusion
centers via 60-to-90 minute infusions, and are normally covered under the medical benefit
provisions of healthcare plans. The prices of these drugs tend to be relatively high compared to
FDCs and other drugs. However, since oncology is a very political therapy area, we believe
payers would have to balance many factors when deciding how to manage these drugs.
Although the FDC Caduet and the IV oncologics Provenge and Avastin are FDA approved and
considered beneficial to patients, they have higher prices than the other drugs in their classes.
Based on this observation, we hypothesized that the relatively high list prices of Caduet,
Provenge, and Avastin would result in greater access restrictions, and that price is the driving
factor that has caused payers to provide relatively restricted coverage.
The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the relative level of importance of different
factors considered by payers in their decision-making processes for managing these two classes
of drugs. Specifically, we examine the varying role of price in the reimbursement process.
Further, we explore the different utilization management techniques for drugs covered under the
pharmacy benefit and the medical benefit provisions of healthcare plans.
This thesis is organized in the following manner. We begin with a brief summary of the origins
of the employment-based healthcare system and Medicare system in the U.S., followed by a
discussion of how drugs are covered under the medical benefit / Part B and the pharmacy benefit
/ Part D of health plans. Next we examine the evolution of utilization management tools used by
payers to direct patients to less expensive therapies and prevent overutilization. Then we discuss
the general coverage decision-making process that payers use to evaluate new drugs, as well as
physicians' incentives in prescribing certain types of drugs. We then give some background on
the controversy surrounding the relatively high price of IV oncologics and a brief discussion of
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the coverage rationale for fixed dose combination drugs. With this knowledge base, we discuss
in detail the methods used for evaluating the hypothesis, including a literature review of the
pricing and reimbursement of the selected IV oncologics and FDCs. Then we lay out a
comprehensive analysis of results followed by a discussion of their implications regarding the
increasing prices of drugs and the role payers can play in controlling the escalating prices. We
follow this with a discussion of the strategies payers and pharmaceutical companies may want to
consider employing in managing IV oncologics and FDCs. Finally, we describe possible follow-
up studies and conclude with a summary of the analysis and implications.
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Chapter 2: Background
Pharmaceutical Reimbursement in the U.S.
America's employer-provided health insurance system evolved and expanded primarily as a
result of domestic wage controls during World War II. Due to the 1942 Stabilization Act,
employers were highly limited in their ability to increase their employees' wages.27 However, the
Stabilization Act passed by Congress did not apply to fringe benefits. Thus, in lieu of increasing
employees' wages, many employers began to offer health insurance. The trend towards
employer-provided health insurance was then further strengthened when Congress declared in
1954 that employer contributions and premiums for employee health insurance would be treated
as tax-deductible business expenses and, for the employee, these contributions and premiums
would not be considered taxable compensation.4 27
A major milestone in U.S. health insurance policy occurred in 1965 with the implementation of
Medicare, a program that provides health insurance to American citizens over the age of 65
years. Medicare was then expanded in the 1970s to include individuals under the age of 65 years
with permanent disabilities, such as end-stage renal disease. In 2003, Congress enhanced
Medicare even further when it passed the Medicare Modernization Act which provided Medicare
participants with prescription drug coverage for the first time, starting in 2006.
Today, Medicare is composed of four parts: Part A - hospital insurance, Part B - medical
insurance, Part C - Medicare Advantage Plans (e.g., HMOs), and Part D - prescription drug
benefits. More specifically, Medicare Part D provides coverage only for prescription drugs, i.e.
drugs that are dispensed at a pharmacy rather than at a physician's office or at a hospital. Drugs
administered at hospitals are covered under Part A via bundled payments in which Medicare
pays hospitals based on a patient's condition rather than for the specific items used for treatment.
Medicare Part B covers, among other items, drugs administered at a physician's office, such as
chemotherapy for cancer patients administered at a doctor's office, freestanding clinic, or
hospital outpatient setting.10 Medicare Advantage Plans are fixed-fee plans, as opposed to fee-
for-service plans, and prescription drugs under these plans are generally covered under Part D.
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Commercial insurance plans generally cover drugs in a manner similar to Medicare. That is, the
medical benefit provisions of commercial plans usually cover drugs administered on an inpatient
basis or at a physician's office, freestanding clinic, or hospital outpatient setting. Separate
pharmacy benefit provisions cover drugs distributed via retail pharmacies, similar to the way
Medicare Part D operates.
Drug Utilization Management
Rising prescription drug spending has been a concern for payers for many years. Cost escalation
in the 1990s and 2000s was particularly rapid. For example, drug spending increased by 14.3%
from 2000 to 2002 and 10.2% in 2003.2 As a result, payers began to employ more aggressive
tactics to curtail overutilization of pharmaceuticals and, in some instances, to direct members
towards using the least expensive drug in a category.
In the 1990s, a new approach known as tiered formularies was developed for managing rising
prescription drug spending and is highly prevalent today. Two-tier plans generally have one tier
for generic drugs (Tier 1) and one tier for brand-drugs (Tier 2), i.e. drugs that are still covered by
a patent. The generic tier has a lower copayment than the brand-drug tier. Thus, members are
financially incentivized to use generic drugs, which tend to cost significantly less for the payer
than brand-drugs. Three-tier formularies have a generic tier (Tier 1), a preferred brand-drugs tier
(Tier 2), and a non-preferred brand-drugs tier (Tier 3). Preferred drugs are generally brand-drugs
with a lower cost to the payer, obtained either through a lower list price or through contracting
with pharmaceutical companies for a lower price. However, some drugs are covered under Tier 2
due to other reasons such as the severity of the disease state or lack of alternative treatments. The
list of preferred brand-drugs differs by payer. Copayments for three-tier plans increase according
to tier. Thus, payers are attempting to incentivize members to first use generic drugs, then
preferred brand-drugs. Four-tier plans are similar to three-tier plans in that they have a generic
tier, preferred brand-drugs tier, and non-preferred brand-drugs tier. However, they also have a
tier (Tier 4) generally for high-cost biologics and life style drugs.
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A rapid increase in the implementation of three- and four-tier formularies occurred between 2000
and 2011 (see Figure 1). One- and two-tier plans occupied 71% of the market in 2000, but only
occupied 18% of the market in 2011. In 2000, there were no four-tier plans and only 27% of the
market was three-tier plans. By 2011, four- and three-tier plans occupied 14% and 63% of the
market, respectively.' A study showed that Medicare beneficiaries in three-tier plans had 14.3%
lower total drug expenditure compared with individuals in lower tiered plans. 4
Nevertheless, spending on prescription drugs has continued to outpace inflation, increasing at an
average annual rate of 4.625% from 2007 to 2010.'
Figure 1: Distribution of Covered Workers Cost-Sharing
Formulas for Prescription Drugs
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation. Employer Benefits Survey, 2011
2011
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Over the last decade, payers have increased the copayments for every tier in an attempt to curtail
unnecessary prescription drug utilization. The average copayments for Tiers 1, 2, and 3 in 2000
were $8, $15, and $29, respectively. The average copayments for Tiers 1, 2, and 3 in 2011 were
$10, $29, and $49, respectively.' In addition to copayment levels, payers have also increased the
copayment differentials between Tiers I and 2 and between Tiers 2 and 3 to more strongly
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encourage the use of generics and preferred brands. The Tier I to 2 copay differential increased
from $7 in 2000 to $19 in 2011, while the Tier 2 to 3 copay differential increased from $14 to
$20.1 The implementation of a fourth tier is another method for controlling prescription drug
spending. Most four-tier plans have copayments for Tiers 1, 2, and 3, but coinsurance for Tier 4.
This is generally due to the relatively high cost of drugs that are on Tier 4. The average
coinsurance for Tier 4 was 29% in 2011.1
Several studies indicate that introducing tiered formularies and increasing copayments
effectively incent plan members to switch to less expensive drugs (i.e., preferred brands or
generics), thereby reducing brand-drug utilization and overall expenditure. A study by Huskamp
et al. showed that when employers switched from a 1-tier formulary to a 3-tier formulary, 41.6%
of enrollees taking ACE inhibitors switched to a drug of a lower tier with lower copayments.
Additionally, 35.1% and 49.4% of enrollees taking proton-pump inhibitors and statins,
respectively, switched to drugs with lower copayments.
However, the Huskamp study did raise an important concern. For enrollees taking a tier-3 drug at
the time of a switch from a 1-tier to a 3-tier formulary, the formulary change resulted in
discontinuing the use of all drugs in that class for 16.2%, 32%, and 21.3% of patients taking
ACE inhibitors, proton-pump inhibitors, and statins, respectively." Another study by Solomon et
al. showed that doubling copayments for newly diagnosed hypertension, hypercholesterolemia,
and diabetes patients delayed initiation of pharmacotherapy by a median of 532, 616, and 286
days, respectively.' 2 Most estimates of price elasticity suggest that increasing a copayment by
10% reduces drug utilization by 1% to 4%.13
Drugs covered under the medical benefit provisions of commercial plans and under Medicare
Part B are those administered in an outpatient setting. These drugs tend to be intravenous drugs
or injectables. They are usually administered at either a physician's office or at an intravenous
infusion clinic. After administering the drug, the physician's office or the infusion clinic bills the
patient's payer for reimbursement for the cost of the drug and the time for infusion. Medicare
patients pay a copayment for the physician's visit and a 20% coinsurance for the drug
administered.'0 However, approximately 80% of Medicare enrollees have Medigap (i.e., private
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individual health insurance to cover healthcare costs not covered by Medicare) which covers the
20% coinsurance. Thus, most Medicare patients only pay the copayment for the visit. For
patients covered under commercial plans, the structure of the payments for drugs covered under
the medical benefit varies widely. Some plans have no coinsurance for drugs covered under the
medical benefit, while others do. However, no matter whether the patient is covered under
Medicare Part B or commercial insurance, there is no system in place to incentivize doctors or
patients to use lower cost therapeutics similar to the system of tiered formularies for drugs
covered under Medicare Part D and the pharmacy benefit of commercial insurance.
In addition to tiered formularies, payers use other types of access restrictions to monitor and
control the utilization of drugs. The three main types of restrictions are prior authorizations, step
edits, and quantity limits. Prior authorizations can be applied to drugs covered under both the
medical benefit and the pharmacy benefit. In general, prior authorization on a drug requires the
physician who is either prescribing or administering the drug to fill out a form or call the payer in
advance of treatment to obtain approval and confirmation that the drug will be covered.
However, the requirements that payers put in place for the prior authorization vary widely. Some
prior authorizations are simply in place to ensure that the drug is being used for an FDA
approved indication. Others require the patient to have tried and failed on other less expensive
drugs before receiving the drug with the prior authorization. These are simply two examples.
Either way, having a prior authorization requirement on a drug deters the physician from using it
because it requires the physician to do additional work. A study examining the impact of a prior
authorization (PA) on pregabalin, a drug used to treat epilepsy and neuropathic pain, showed
that, compared with non-PA plans, plans requiring a PA for pregabalin experienced a 5.0
percentage point lower increase in patients using pregabalin year over year. Furthermore,
utilization in PA plans of other anticonvulsants was 3.7 percentage points higher than in non-PA
plans.15 Another study demonstrated that the implementation of a PA on non-preferred lipid-
lowering statins for dual Medicare and Medicaid enrollees in Michigan was associated with an
immediate 58% reduction in prescriptions of non-preferred brands and a corresponding increase
in prescriptions for preferred drugs.16
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Another technique payers use to encourage cost-effective prescribing is known as the step edit.
The goal of a step edit is to encourage the use of therapeutically equivalent, lower-cost
alternatives before "stepping up" to a more expensive therapy.6 A step edit can only be placed on
drugs distributed via retail pharmacies, since under a step edit a pharmacy automatically switches
one drug out for another at the point of dispensing. This is not possible for a drug administered at
a physician's office because the physician first gives the patient the drug and then bills the
insurance company or Medicare. Thus, the insurance company or Medicare does not have the
opportunity to switch out one drug for another. With a step edit, electronic messaging is sent
directly to the pharmacist from the patient's payer's adjudication computer system to switch the
drug for a different one.6
Step edits are very effective at reducing cost. For example, a study which looked at
implementing a generics first initiative for antidepressants found that placing a step edit on all
branded antidepressants resulted in a 13% decrease in antidepressant drug cost, from $4.16
PMPM (per member per month) to $3.62 PMPM. Overall, implementing a step edit on all
branded antidepressants requiring patients to first try and fail a generic before moving to a
branded drug saved this insurer approximately $1.9 million in 2005.' Another study analyzed the
financial impact of a step edit for angiotensin receptor blockers (ARBs) requiring prior use of
angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors (ACEIs). These are two classes of drugs commonly
used to treat hypertension. The study found that the average cost per day of antihypertensive
drug therapy was 12.8% lower in the step edit group compared to the group of patients without
step edits.'
Quantity limits are the least complex technique used by payers to manage appropriate utilization
of drugs. A quantity limit prevents a retail pharmacy from dispensing more than a specified
amount of a drug for a given period time. For physician-administered drugs, a quantity limit
prevents the physician from receiving reimbursement for more than a specified amount of the
drug for a given period of time. This incentivizes the physician to not administer more than that
amount to the patient. In general, the goal of quantity limits is to prevent overuse of drugs. Thus,
they are most often implemented on drugs prone to over utilization such as opioids for pain.
However, implementing a quantity limit costs the payer money in administration and
17
enforcement. Thus, the payer must determine for a given drug if the cost-savings from
prevention of over utilization outweigh the administrative costs of the quantity limit.
Figure 2: Summary of Drug Utilization Techniques
iPharmiacy or Medical
Restriction IBeniefitPups
Tiered Formulary Pharmacy Benefit only Steer members to generics and
preferred brands
Prior 
.Medical and Pharmacy Widely varies
Authorization Benefit
Step Edit Pharmacy Benefit only $witches out the prescribed drug for
another drug at the pharmacy
Quantity Limit Pharmacy Benefit only Limits the amount of drug
y distributed/administered
Drug Coverage Process
The process for making coverage decisions-deciding what drugs a payer will cover and what
ones it will not-is similar across insurers. Every insurer has a pharmacy and therapeutics (P&T)
committee. Usually, this committee is composed of physicians, pharmacy directors, and medical
directors. The committee decides whether a drug should be covered, and in some cases, at what
level a drug should be covered. Additionally, every insurer has a contracting group. The
contracting group is responsible for negotiating pricing with pharmaceutical companies.
For some plans, the P&T committee is shown the contracting information before making its
coverage decisions. For the majority of plans, though, the P&T committee is not shown any
contracting information. Rather, this information is incorporated after the P&T committee makes
their decision.
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The P&T committee usually rates a drug as superior, inferior, or comparable. Drugs that are
declared superior are automatically added to the formulary. Those that are declared inferior are
not added to the formulary. Only about 10% of all drugs are rated superior or inferior by most
P&T committees. Most drugs are rated comparable and are sent to the contracting group which
then determines whether and how to cover the drug based on the contracting group's ability to
obtain a good price. Figure 3 summarizes the drug coverage process.
Figure 3: General Drug Coverage Review Process
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The contracting relationship between payers and pharmaceutical companies is complex.
Pharmaceutical companies contract with payers to obtain better access for their drugs. Multi-tier
formularies and other drug utilization management techniques such as step edits result in payers
having increased bargaining power to negotiate rebates with drug manufacturers by guaranteeing
an increased volume of prescriptions for preferred drugs." Thus, pharmaceutical companies are
willing to offer payers rebates for better access and thus, increased volume. However, this type
of contracting only occurs for drugs that do not already have good access. For example, drugs in
areas of high unmet need such as epilepsy tend to already be placed on Tier 2 without any
additional access restrictions. Thus, the pharmaceutical company has no incentive to contract
because it cannot achieve any better access than it already has. However, for other therapy areas
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with many drugs on the market that are considered comparable, such as statins, payers will place
the most expensive drug on the highest tier and possibly have additional restrictions such as step
edits. As a result, the pharmaceutical companies are incentivized to contract with payers for
better access for these drugs. These contracts can take many forms. The most common is a
straight rebate on the list price of the drug for better access. Other types of contracts such as
bundling exist as well. Bundling is when a pharmaceutical company offers a rebate on one or
several drugs, but requires that all drugs receive preferred access. In other words, access for each
individual drug is not negotiated independently.
As expected, pharmaceutical contracts with payers are highly confidential because
pharmaceutical companies do not want one payer demanding to receive the same rebate as
another payer. Thus, it is difficult for the public to fully comprehend what payers are actually
paying for these drugs. If payers were more open about the details of the contracts, the public
would have a greater understanding around pricing and coverage issues. There would also be
greater visibility into the specifics that determine how payers cover a drug, such as the
importance of efficacy versus contracted rebates. As a result, the confidentiality of these
contracts makes it very difficult for the public to truly understand the impact rebates and other
pricing approaches from pharmaceutical manufacturers have on their coverage decisions.
Physician Incentives
Physicians have varying, but limited, financial incentives to control overall drug costs. The types
of incentives depend on whether the physician is prescribing a drug covered under the pharmacy
benefit of an insurance plan or administering drugs under the medical benefit. In general,
physicians have no direct financial incentives for drugs covered under the pharmacy benefit. Yet,
some creative approaches have been tried to incent physicians to control prescription drug costs.
One approach involves negotiated capitation agreements between physician groups and payers.
In these circumstances, the payer sets a per member per month (PMPM) drug cost goal for the
physician group. If the physician group manages to achieve a lower PMPM drug cost, then they
are financially rewarded. But if their PMPM drug cost is higher than the negotiated per capita
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amount, they lose money. This approach attempts to shift the decision-making process to
physicians with an incentive to hold down costs. However, the technique is relatively rare
because most physician groups are not large enough to effectively manage the risk associated
with this approach. 28
For drugs covered under the medical benefit provisions of a plan, the method of physician
reimbursement can impact drug selection. Generally, physicians are reimbursed by payers based
on the sales price of the drug plus a certain percent. For example, Medicare reimburses
physicians for the average sales price (ASP) of the drug plus 6%. Therefore, theoretically, a
physician is financially incentivized to prescribe higher priced drugs because they will earn a
greater absolute value. Traditionally, Medicare reimbursement was based on average wholesale
price (AWP) minus X%, not the physician's purchasing cost of the therapeutic agent. This
approach allowed physicians to make a significant profit on the drug itself because physician
groups negotiated with wholesale distributors for lower prices than AWP.9 Thus, physicians
could make a very large amount of money on the administration of drugs. Although the switch to
ASP plus X% may have hurt the profitability of this reimbursement approach, physicians are still
financially incentivized to prescribe more expensive drugs.
A more subtle incentive for doctors may lie in their relationship with pharmaceutical companies.
Sales representatives from pharmaceutical companies spend significant time and energy with
physicians promoting their companies' drug portfolio. While there are no direct financial
incentive arrangements between physicians and pharmaceutical companies, there have been
concerns that gifts from sales representatives impact physician behavior regarding drug
utilization. To address this concern, PhRMA, the drug industry's trade and lobbying group,
issued stringent guidelines in 2008 that prevent pharmaceutical companies from giving
physicians excessive gifts.2 9
Coverage of Intravenous Oncologics
Intravenous (IV) oncologics are an example of drugs that are covered under Medicare Part B or
the medical benefit of commercial plans. An important aspect of oncologics is that they are one
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of Medicare's six protected classes of drugs. In 2006, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) specified six "protected" classes of drugs-antidepressants, antipsychotics,
anticonvulsants, antiretrovirals, immunosuppressants, and oncologics. The protected classes
originated from a review of formularies of comparable drug programs, such as Medicaid and the
Federal Employees Health Benefit Program, which showed that for clinical effectiveness,
patients taking these drugs require uninterrupted utilization. Additionally, there was some
concern that plans would not cover these drugs due to their relatively high costs.22
CMS requires health plans to cover "all or substantially all" of the approved drugs in each of the
six classes.2 2 The wording "substantially all" is purposely vague. Some interpret it as requiring
plans to cover all drugs at the lowest copayment, while others believe it allows for payers to still
manage the classes with step edits, prior authorizations, and quantity limits. Either way, it results
in a conversation between the payer and CMS regarding the coverage of drugs in these classes.
The Medicare Prescription Drug Simplification Act of 2006, section 112, extended the
requirement of covering "all or substantially all" of the drugs in the six protected classes for
additional years.
Another strong impact on the coverage of oncologics is the high level of unmet need and the
political sensitivity of the therapy area. Payers face a large amount of public pressure to make all
drugs in the oncology space available to patients.2 ' The patient advocacy groups for various
types of cancer are incredibly vocal and strong with respect to drug coverage. Additionally, for
most types of cancer there are very few or no alternative treatment options, which makes it even
more difficult for payers to deny access to the limited available treatment options.
As many of these drugs have sales of over $1 billion annually, access and coverage of
intravenous oncologics is financially important to payers and manufacturers. Figure 4 presents
annual sales amounts for the top intravenous oncologics. 4 0 The variance in sales between the
different oncologics is due to a combination of the size of the specific cancer market the drug has
been approved for, the number of indications, the price of the drug, and how early in the
treatment paradigm the drug is used. The overall cancer market was estimated at $45 billion in
2006 and currently represents over 7% of global pharmaceutical sales. Rough estimates indicate
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that over I million new cases of cancer are diagnosed in the US per year, and approximately
500,000 people die of cancer annually, making cancer the second leading cause of death."
Figure 4: 2009 Global Sales of Intravenous Oncology
Drugs
Source: BCC Research - Biologic Therapeutic Drugs
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Finally, off-label use of drugs in oncology is a significant issue. When pursuing FDA approval
for an oncology drug, the pharmaceutical companies must select a specific type of oncology to
target for its approved label (e.g., metastatic renal cell carcinoma or HER-2 positive metastatic
breast cancer). However, sometimes an oncology drug's mechanism of action suggests that it
would be effective in treating other cancer types besides the one for which it was approved.
Physicians will frequently try various non-indicated oncology drugs for different types of
cancers, but there can be a problem as to whether the payers will pay for this. Due to the
increasing price of drugs, payers are becoming more and more hesitant to pay for off-label use of
oncologics. The sum total of these coverage issues makes IV oncologics a particularly complex
class of drugs.
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Coverage of Fixed Dose Combination Drugs
Fixed dose combination drugs are interesting because their value is often questioned by payers,
and thus, they tend to encounter significant access restrictions. A fixed dose combination (FDC)
is a combination of two or more FDA-approved drugs at given doses. Therapy areas in which
fixed dose combination drugs are used include the prevention of cardiovascular disease,
hypertension, asthma, diabetes, and HIV/AIDS. The rationale for use of fixed dose combination
drugs varies by therapy area. For example, FDC drugs for blood pressure are used because two
drugs, each typically working at a separate site, block different blood pressure pathways.
Additionally, the second drug of the combination may check counter-regulatory system activity
triggered by the other.24
One universal argument for the use of FDCs is increased compliance, since FDCs combine two
drugs into a single dosage. Only having to take one pill can increase a patient's likelihood of
remaining compliant with their medication. A study by Bangalore et al. showed that fixed dose
combinations reduce the risk of non-compliance by 24-26%.46 This is particularly pertinent in the
treatment of blood pressure where compliance has been a major issue. The fixed dose
combination drugs for blood pressure have been shown to offer equivalent or better efficacy than
monotherapy, and offer an improved chance of increased compliance.2 Fixed dose combinations
of anti-retroviral therapies have also improved efficacy. Prolonging anti-retroviral regimen
durability is very important to achieving long-term treatment success for HIV patients because
successive antiretroviral regimens have shown progressively shorter durability. Studies have
shown that once-daily fixed dose combination anti-retroviral therapies significantly increase the
length of therapy duration.4 7
A strong motivation for producing a fixed dose combination drug for a drug manufacturer is to
extend the patent life of a drug that is about to lose patent exclusivity. A manufacturer can obtain
a patent for the combination of two generic drugs. As a result, the manufacturer is still able to
command market exclusivity for the fixed dose combination and thus, can price the product at
the level of branded drugs, rather than generics.
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On the other hand, many physicians and payers are skeptical about the benefits of fixed dose
combination drugs. Physicians are concerned about the inability to adjust the dose of one of the
elements of the combination drug individually. Also, differing pharmacokinetics of the drugs
might cause an issue with the frequency of administration. 2 6 Since fixed dose combination drugs
are frequently a method of extending a drug's patent and thus maintaining a high price for the
drug, most payers do not see the value of the fixed dose combination over taking each of the
cheaper drugs separately. Rather, payers tend to consider FDCs life-style drugs that provide
convenience rather than drugs that increase survival. A case in point is fixed dose combinations
developed to prevent tuberculosis, but which had significant difficulties obtaining coverage in
the US. These FDCs were recommended by WHO and the International Union Against
Tuberculosis and Lung Disease because they simplify prescribing the drugs, and have the
potential to limit the risk of drug-resistant tuberculosis arising as a result of inappropriate drug
selection and monotherapy. 45 However, these FDCs to prevent tuberculosis have received little
uptake in the US due to the lack of coverage by payers. In general, many payers regularly place
stringent access restrictions on fixed dose combination drugs. Though the efficacy of FDCs is
rarely questioned, the added value of FDCs is often not considered to be better than the
alternative of taking each drug individually.
Despite the criticisms of FDCs, cardiovascular fixed dose combination drugs have the potential
to be billion dollar molecules. Vytorin had over $2 billion in sales for 2007, 2008, and 2009.
Exforge, which just launched in 2007, is projected to have over a $1 billion in US sales annually
by its peak. Figure 5 provides detailed sales numbers. Although these are significant sales levels
for individual drugs, they represent a small portion of the total cardiovascular market, which is
estimated at $144 billion in 2010. Cardiovascular drugs are the largest selling class of drugs,
mainly because heart disease/stroke is the leading cause of mortality globally.39
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Figure 5: Annual Sales of Fixed Dose Combination
Cardiovascular Drugs
Source: BCC Research - Cardiovascular Therapeutic Drugs
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Growing Concern over Drug Prices
In light of rising pharmaceutical costs, the aging population, and the increased use of costly
specialty drugs, the escalation of drug costs is a growing concern in the U.S. Although drugs
represent only a small portion of the U.S.'s overall healthcare spending (-10%), they have been
the fastest growing segment of the healthcare market in the U.S. over the past 15 years (see
Figure 6). Both increased utilization and price increases have contributed to the increase in
overall drug spending. The number of prescriptions bought in the U.S. increased by 39% from
1999 to 2009. Retail prescription prices increased on average 3.6% annually from 2000 to 2009,
while the average inflation rate was only 2.5%. This cost escalation has resulted in many people
calling for the government to take a more active role in negotiating drug prices. However,
opponents believe that government intervention could have unintended consequences such as
stifling drug innovation and negatively impacting patient care.' 7
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Figure 6: Annual Percentage Increase in US Health
Expenditures
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation calculations using National Health Expenditures data from Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services
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To address the concern about the growing drug expenditure, payers continue to implement new
techniques for reimbursement. As mentioned previously, many prescription drug plans have
introduced a tier 4 for relatively high-cost specialty drugs or lifestyle products. Tier 4 drugs have
a coinsurance requirement (averaging 29%) instead of the flat copayment found in Tiers 1, 2, and
3. Medicare has been particularly aggressive in introducing a Tier 4. Among Medicare Part D
payers in 2008, 87% of plans have a Tier 4 for specialty drugs, while only 7% of workers
covered by commercial plans have a Tier 4 . Some plans are now experimenting with having a
Tier 5 so that they can distinguish between preferred specialty drugs (Tier 4) and non-preferred
specialty drugs (Tier 5). Tier 5 drugs would have a higher copayment or coinsurance than Tier 4
drugs.2'
Another burgeoning technique to control drug spending is switching physician-administered
drugs from the medical benefit to the pharmacy benefit. This would allow payers to have
significantly more control over the use of the drugs. However, for this to occur, physicians would
have to receive their drugs via a specialty pharmacy that the payer is contracted with or owns.
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Thus, the physician would no longer be purchasing the drugs independently and billing the payer
for reimbursement. WellPoint has already begun to require members to obtain certain drugs
through their specialty pharmacy which is part of their in-house pharmacy benefits manager
(PBM) NextRx.2
In recent years, drug prices for oncologics have received significant attention due to the large
number of cancer drugs in development and the launch within the past 10 years of some
relatively highly priced oncologics such as Avastin, Vectibix, and Provenge. Avastin initially
launched in 2004 for the treatment of metastatic colorectal cancer with a monthly cost of $4,400.
Genentech, the manufacturer of Avastin, came under fierce criticism from physicians and
patients in 2006 for Avastin's cost when it received approval for the treatment of metastatic non-
small-cell lung cancer (NSCLC). The monthly treatment cost for Avastin to treat NSCLC at that
time ranged up to $8,800 per month or over $100,000 per year.' 8 Avastin is an IV oncologic,
meaning that it is covered either under Medicare Part B or the medical benefit of commercial
plans for patients. Some patients have a 20% coinsurance associated with drugs covered under
the medical benefit, with no out-of-pocket limit. Thus, these patients could have paid over
$20,000 per year just for Avastin. As a result of the public outcry, Genentech decided to cap the
total cost of Avastin at $55,000 for patients below a certain income level. However, there was
still concern over Avastin's price because in clinical trials for NSCLC, it appeared to increase
survival by only two months, from a median of 10.3 months to 12.3 months.' 8
The launch of Provenge by drug manufacturer Dendreon is another example of the challenges
facing relatively highly priced oncologics. Provenge's $93,000 price tag caused CMS to launch a
national coverage review just two months after its launch in 2010. National coverage reviews are
very rare and hardly occur so soon after launch. The director of the Coverage and Analysis
Group at CMS, Louis Jacques, stated that "While the cost of Provenge was not an issue in our
coverage determination, I think it is fair to say that the cost of Provenge created a public buzz
around this particular product, which then made it a higher-profile issue and something that we
should look at." 2 0 The result of CMS's national coverage review was that each payer would be
allowed to determine on its own whether and how to cover Provenge, even though Provenge is
an oncology treatment and thus, included in one of Medicare's six protected classes.
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Though the costs of Avastin and Provenge may seem high, the development costs and timelines
to bring a new drug to market in general are significant and increasing. Estimates for the cost of
bringing a new drug to market range from $800 million to over $2 billion. Although the exact
amount of money that is required to develop a drug is debated, all experts agree that
development costs are rising rapidly.44 As a result, pharmaceutical manufacturers need to
generate more revenue to be sustainable. In particular for oncology drugs, the availability of
effective treatments has made it difficult for manufacturers to recruit patients for clinical trials.
At the same time, payers have been demanding overall survival data. These two aspects have
extended the amount of time to get an oncology drug to market.4 2 Adams et al. estimated that it
costs over $1 billion dollars to bring an oncology drug to market due to the low success rates and
long duration of clinical trials. In this study, oncology was the second most expensive therapy
area in which to develop a drug. 4 3 And, this does not take into account the opportunity costs that
companies are incurring by investing their money in risky drug development. Finally, the
manufacturing and regulatory costs for biologics, which include most branded intravenous
oncologics, are very high compared to small molecule drugs. Companies manufacturing
biologics need to obtain manufacturing approval from the FDA for every single plant.
Additionally, the synthesis process of a biologic is significantly more cumbersome and thus,
more expensive when compared to the manufacturing of a small molecule. Given these risks and
costs, one may consider the recent increases in prices of drugs justified.
The controversy over drug prices raises the issue of why pricing of drugs is different from
pricing in other industries. For most other industries, the U.S. relies on competitive markets to
align prices with value to consumers and cost to producers. However, there are several aspects of
the pharmaceutical market that interfere with this ideal. First, the patenting of drugs creates an
exclusive environment where there is no competition and thus, no alternative for consumers to
select. Second, insurance companies are in the middle of healthcare interactions, shielding the
consumer from the actual cost of healthcare. This makes the consumer less price sensitive
because he/she is not seeing the full extent of pricing.' Finally, many healthcare situations are
life and death. It is very hard for our American society to admit that the life of an individual is
only worth a finite amount of money. However, in some other countries such as Canada and the
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UK, society is stating that their healthcare system is only willing to pay a certain amount for
value. In the UK, this is in the form of cost per quality-adjusted life year (QALY). If a drug
exceeds a set cost per QALY, the government's universal healthcare system does not cover it.
In the U.S., a key question is what further can be done to control drug costs? And how will these
cost containment techniques vary by drug class? IV oncologics are included in one of Medicare's
six protected classes, are reimbursed via Medicare Part B or the medical benefit of commercial
plans, and are politically a very sensitive topic. Given these factors, how will the growing costs
of oncology drugs be addressed? In contrast, fixed dose combination drugs for cardiovascular
disease have questionable value, are managed by Medicare Part D plans or the pharmacy benefit
of commercial plans, and have less immediate survival consequences. As a result, will the U.S.
healthcare system determine that it will not pay a premium for them?
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Chapter 3: Thesis Objective and Methodology
Thesis Objective
Increasing drug prices have been and continue to be a major issue in the U.S. Typically, payers
are responsible for reigning in healthcare costs in the U.S.'s employer-based healthcare system
through the implementation of utilization management tools. These utilization management tools
drive members to lower cost drugs, and thus, deter pharmaceutical companies from pricing drugs
too high. The objective of this thesis is to identify the relative importance of the factors
considered by payers to be important in drug reimbursement and, specifically, to examine the
role price plays. To do this, we chose two very different classes of drugs: cardiovascular fixed
dose combination drugs and intravenous oncologics. This selection allows us to assess the role of
pricing for a set of drugs that are of questionable benefit and reimbursed under the pharmacy
benefit (FDCs), and a set of drugs that are highly political and reimbursed under the medical
benefit (IV oncologics). We can then infer whether pricing plays an important role for coverage
of all drugs or if its role varies depending on the class of drugs. Secondarily, we explore the
utilization techniques used by payers and examine if altering the price of any of these drugs
would improve access and thus, overall sales.
Literature Review
An extensive review of the literature was conducted to understand the pricing and coverage of
the select drugs as well as to gain an understanding of the factors that contributed to payers'
decisions regarding these drugs. The Red Book provided the list prices for all of the select drugs.
Medicare's Formulary Finder program allowed us to obtain the formulary coverage of the select
drugs for fifteen different Medicare plans including nine large national plans and five regional
plans. FDA regulatory submissions included on the FDA's website were used to obtain specific
indications for each of the select drugs as well as information regarding their clinical trials. Drug
websites and their prescribing inserts were analyzed to determine the dosing regimen and
associated overall cost for the IV oncologics. Additionally, numerous articles and papers in the
mainstream media, scientific journals, and other media outlets were used to gain a strong
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background regarding how payers are currently attempting to manage drug prices and utilization
as well as the impact of high drug costs on the public.
Interview Guides
To assess the hypothesis that drug pricing is a driving factor in the coverage decisions of
cardiovascular fixed dose combination drugs and intravenous oncologics, two interview guides
and a pre-interview questionnaire were created. The pre-interview questionnaire was designed to
obtain facts from payers specific to their company prior to the interview in order to better use the
interview time. Additionally, the pre-interview questionnaire allowed us to address during the
interview more specific questions around coverage decisions. The interview guide for payers
examines not only the role of pricing in coverage decisions, but also the role of other factors in
the process so we could obtain an understanding of the relative importance of pricing. These
interview guides are a combination of quantitative and qualitative questions to allow for
comparison across discussions and to obtain more substantive results. The interview guide for
the oncology drug distributor is composed of qualitative, open-ended questions in order to better
understand the role drug distributors play in attempting to control drug prices.
Payer Pre-Interview Questionnaire:
1) Number of lives your plan covers:
Commercial Lives Medicare Lives
Medical Benefit / Part B
Pharmacy Benefit / Part D
Total
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2) Average copay amount ($):
Commercial Plan Medicare Plan
Tier 1
Tier 2
Tier 3
Tier 4
Tier 5
3) Your plan's coverage of the following drugs. Examples of restrictions are step edits (SE),
prior authorizations (PA), and quantity limits (QL):
Commercial Medicare
Tier Restrictions Tier Restrictions
Caduet
Vytorin
Exforge
Provenge
Erbitux
Vectibix
Avastin
Payer Interview Guide:
1) Please elaborate on the details of each of the prior authorizations and step edits for each
of the drugs.
2) On a 5 point scale where 1 is low impact and 5 is high impact, what influence do the
following factors have on formulary decisions for each of the following drugs:
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a. Does the level of impact of each of the factors differ for Caduet, Vytorin or
Exforge?
Caduet Vytorin Exforge
Outcomes Data
Side effects Data
Physician Demand
Patient Demand
List Price
Contracting
Compliance
3) Please explain
Exforge.
any differences in the coverage decisions around Caduet, Vytorin and
4) Is the decision not to cover (drug not covered) price related?
a. To what level would (drug not covered) have to lower its price to obtain
coverage?
5) What would the pharmaceutical company have to do to obtain better coverage for (drug
not covered)?
6) On a 5 point scale where 1 is low impact and 5 is high impact, what influence do the
following factors have on formulary decisions for each of the following drugs:
a. Does the level of impact of each of these factors vary for Provenge, Erbitux,
Vectibix, or Avastin?
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7) Please explain any differences in the coverage decisions around Provenge, Erbitux,
Vectibix, and Avastin.
8) Is the decision not to cover (drug with high level of restrictions) price related?
a. To what level would (drug with high level of restrictions) have to lower its price
to obtain less restrictive access?
9) What would the pharmaceutical company have to do to obtain better coverage for (drug
with high level of restrictions)?
10) At what level are coverage decisions made?
11) Is there anything historically that has happened to the company which strongly impacts
how coverage decisions for any of these drugs are made?
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Provenge Erbitux Vectibix Avastin
Time to progression
Overall survival
Control of symptoms
Side effect data
Physician Demand
Patient Demand
List Price
Contracting
Level of Unmet Need
in Therapy Area
Public Policies (e.g.
Medicare)
Oncology Drug Distributor Interview Guide:
1) Please give an overview of your business model.
2) Does your organization have preferred oncologics?
a. If yes, what is the basis for a preferred oncologic (e.g. efficacy, contracting, price,
etc.)?
3) Please explain the genesis for your utilization management system in oncology.
a. What were physicians' initial reactions?
4) What increase in overall survival is considered significant enough to be considered a
more efficacious drug?
a. Does the level vary by cancer type?
b. How about progression-free survival/time to progression?
5) Are convenience factors such as time of the infusion taken into account in the
development of your utilization management system?
6) What does opting into the utilization framework entail for a physician office?
7) What percentage of physicians in your network has opted into the utilization framework?
8) What challenges have you encountered while implementing your utilization management
system?
Selection of Interview Participants
There were two primary considerations in selecting participants for the payer interviews. First,
we wanted a mixture of national and regional payers in order to eliminate any regional bias.
Second, we targeted national and regional payers with a large number of members to obtain a
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decent representation of U.S. citizens with a small sample size. Specific individuals were
selected based on a combination of contacts from my professional network, suggestions from
thesis advisors, and leads drawn from preceding interviews. The result was seven interviews,
including three national payers, two regional payers, and two people from a large oncology drug
distributor. The interview participants tend to hold positions in the pharmacy department such as
pharmacy directors or vice presidents of pharmacy.
It should be noted that the goal of these interviews was not to reach a statistically significant
conclusion, but rather to obtain directional information. The interviewed payers collectively
cover over forty million pharmacy benefit / Part D lives and just under a hundred million medical
benefit / Part B lives in the U.S., which we think is an adequate representation to answer the
question posed by this thesis. We acknowledge that a larger study may be necessary to achieve a
statistically significant conclusion.
The identities of those interviewed and their companies will remain confidential as the
information they provided concerning how their companies operate and make decisions is highly
proprietary. Also, the identity of those associated with individual responses will remain
confidential.
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Chapter 4: Results
Summary of Literature Review and Public Sources
In order to gain a preliminary indication of whether pricing strongly influences the coverage of
fixed dose combination cardiovascular drugs and intravenous oncologics, the prices of each of
the select drugs were obtained from the 2011 Red Book. For the FDCs, the prices were obtained
for 30 pills since that is the number of pills a patient must take per month. As shown in Figure 7,
Caduet has the highest list price followed by Vytorin and then Exforge.
Figure 7: Fixed Dose Combination Cardiovascular Drug
Pricing
Source: Red Book 2011
5 mg amlodipineCaduet 5 mg atodipin 30 pills $134.84
10 mg atorvastatin
Vytorin 10 mg ezetimibe 30 pills $124.1620 mg simvastatin
Exforge 5 mg amlodipine 30 pills $97.06160 mg valsartan
The Red Book was also used to obtain prices per vial for the select intravenous oncologics.
Dosing information for each oncologic was obtained from the drug's prescription information
insert. Prices were calculated by first determining the dose for an average male. Then the most
cost-efficient number of drug bags was chosen to fulfill this dose. Next the list price per bag was
retrieved from the 2011 Red Book. Finally, the cost was divided by the number of weeks
between doses in order to obtain a weekly cost (see Figure 8).
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Figure 8: Oncology Drug Pricing Calculations for
Maintenance Dosing
Source: Individual Drug Prescribing Information and Red Book 2011
3 doses at 2
Provenge Prostate week N/A N/A $93,000 per dose $46,500
intervals
Colorectal
Erbitux 250 mg/m2 2 x 100 ml bags $1,152 per 100 ml bagErbitux ~475 mg$345
Head and per week 2 x 50 ml bags $576 per 50 ml bag
Neck
~6mg/kg per IVectibix Colorectal 2week p 260 mg 3 x 5 ml bags $1,019 per 5 ml bag $3,056
Colorectal 10 m/kg
Avastin | Renal cell per2 weeks x 16 ml bag $2,680 per 16 ml bag $3350
- x 4 ml bag $670 per 4 ml bag
Non-small 15 mg/kg
cell lung |per3 weeks
* Dose per week assumes a weight of 86.6 kg and a body surface area of 1.9 m2
It should be noted that this approach to determining the cost per week has certain limitations. For
example, some infusion clinics reuse bags for different patients rather than discarding any
remaining drug, though this is a rare practice. Additionally, the approach does not take into
account the duration of treatment. Some of the oncologics are given to patients for over a year,
such as Avastin, while Provenge is only given in three doses over a six week period.
To obtain preliminary reimbursement data, we used the Medicare Formulary Finder website,
which allows participants to determine the coverage of Medicare Part D prescriptions for plans in
their area. Since the Medicare Formulary Finder tool presents the coverage of only Part D drugs,
we were only able to determine the coverage of the select fixed dose combination cardiovascular
drugs. We obtained the coverage of the FDCs for seven national payers and eight regional payers
(see Appendix A for the names of the payers). As shown in Figure 9, approximately 80% of the
payers did not cover Caduet, while less than 20% of payers did not cover Vytorin and Exforge.
Also, those plans that did cover Caduet placed it on Tier 3. Since Caduet is the most expensive of
the three FDCs, this suggests that price may be playing a role in its lack of coverage.
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Additionally, Exforge, the least expensive of the three FDCs, is on Tier 2 for 60% of the payers,
while Vytorin is on Tier 2 for less than 45% of payers. This suggests that Exforge's low list price
may have helped it gain favorable coverage.
Figure 9: 2011 Medicare Coverage of Fixed Dose
Combination Cardiovascular Drugs
Source: Medicare Formulary Finder
Caduet
E Tier 2
Vytorin m Tier 3
n Tier 4
N Not Covered
Exforge
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Although we were unable to use Medicare Formulary Finder or any other publicly available tool
to determine coverage for the select intravenous oncologics, recent articles discuss coverage and
describe attempts to control the cost of these drugs. As we discussed in more detail in Chapter 2,
when Avastin gained approval for the treatment of non-small cell lung cancer, there was
significant public concern over the cost of the drug since the dose was increased from 10mg/kg
to 15mg/kg. To assuage concerns, Genentech, the manufacturer of Avastin, placed a price cap on
the drug of $55,000 for patients below a certain income level. 18 Provenge, the highest priced
drug of our select oncologics, has experienced the most problems obtaining reimbursement.
Shortly after launch, CMS began a national coverage review.20 This is very rare for an oncologic,
which is one of Medicare's protected classes and, as such, plans are supposed to cover all of the
drugs in that class. However, CMS's national coverage review came to the conclusion that they
would allow plans to make their own decisions on how to cover Provenge.
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Summary of Payer Inteniews
In order to determine what role pricing plays in the coverage of these drugs, we spoke with five
payers. First we asked them to review a list of factors involved in their coverage decision-making
process for fixed dose combination cardiovascular drugs and intravenous oncologics and assign a
score of one to five to each factor, where one is low importance in the coverage decision-making
process and five is high importance in the process. Then we averaged the scores across all five
payers. We also determined two weighted averages: one based on the total number of lives the
payer represents, and the other based on the total number of Medicare lives the payer represents.
The fixed dose combination drugs were weighted using pharmacy and Part D lives since these
drugs are covered under the pharmacy / Part D benefit, while the intravenous oncologics were
weighted using medical benefit and Part B lives. Payers did not vary their assigned scores by
specific drug within a class (i.e., the scores for FDC's were the same, whether the payer was
considering Caduet, Vytorin, or Exforge). Thus, we present our results as scores for FDCs and
oncologics as two separate groups, rather than for each individual drug within each group.
Figure 10 presents the results of the scores assigned by payers. Independent of weighting, overall
survival / outcomes data / time to progression played a more important role in the coverage
decision-making process for oncologics than for the FDCs. Side effects data / control of
symptoms, physician demand, and patient demand also all had more of an impact on coverage
decisions for oncologics than for FDCs, but to a lesser degree. However, list price and
contracting were much more important in the coverage decision-making process for FDCs in
comparison to oncologics. In general, these comparisons hold true for all types of weighting of
the data.
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Figure 10: Average Ranking of Level of Importance of
Various Factors in the Coverage Decision-Making Process
for FDC Cardiovascular Drugs and IV Oncologics
Outcomes Data/
Overall Survival / 4.0 4.8 3.6 5.0 3.1 4.9
Time to Progression
4.4 4.6 4.2 4.5 4.2 4.6Contml of Symptoms
Physician Demand 2.2 2.8 2.2 2.9 2.0 2.7
Patient Demand 2.4 2.8 2.2 2.9 2.2 2.7
List Price 4.4 2.8 4.8 2.9 4.5 3.0
Contracting 4.4 1.8 4.8 1.3 4.8 1.8
Compliance 3 - 2.5 - 3.4 -
Unmet Need -5.0 -5.0 -5.0
Public Policies -3.4 3.3 3.9
Payers were unanimous in the strong role pricing plays for the coverage of fixed dose
combination drugs. All payers indicated that any variance in coverage of the select FDCs was
based on price. That is, in order for pharmaceutical companies to obtain better coverage they
would be required to lower their prices. However, payers stated that price did not impact
coverage decisions for intravenous oncologics. One reason payers stated for this was that public
policies such as state mandates to cover all oncologics and Medicare's six protected classes
required them to cover all oncologics independent of price. Payers noted that they were limited
in their attempts to manage oncologic drug utilization to prior authorizations which check that
the drug is being used appropriately.
Specifically, payers mentioned that they had no mechanisms to direct appropriate patients to
more cost-effective treatment pathways in oncology. One payer said that they were beginning to
distribute recommended cost-effective pathways to their physicians. However, all other payers
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said that there were no tools they could use to direct patients. These drugs, since they are covered
under the medical benefit / Part B, are not tiered. Thus, payers cannot use patient out-of-pocket
costs to incent patients to utilize less expensive treatments. Additionally, payers cannot exclude
any of these drugs from their benefit plans due to public policies. Finally, payers mentioned that
it is difficult even to enforce a prior authorization for these drugs, since they are distributed via
group purchasing organizations to the physicians, who then bill the insurance company for
reimbursement after the patient has received the drug. Payers recognize that this is very
frustrating for physicians, because if a doctor gives the drug to a patient and then discovers that
the indication was not covered by that patient's plan, the physician either has to pay for the drug
out of his own pocket or attempt to have the patient pay for the drug.
Discussion of Specific Interview Questions
What influence do the following factors have on formulary decisions for each of the
following fixed dose combination cardiovascular drugs? Does your response vary by drug?
All payers said their responses would not vary by drug specifically. Three out of five payers
ranked outcomes data and side effects data at a level five, while the other two gave them lower
rankings. However, all payers agreed that the efficacy and safety data for the fixed dose
combination drugs was not particularly compelling. All respondents gave physician and patient
demand a score of three or less, indicating that these factors play a small role in their decision-
making process. Interestingly, payers ranked list price and contracting at a similar level of
importance as outcomes and side effect data. However, payers were split on the level of
importance of compliance with these drugs. Three payers considered the compliance benefits of
fixed dose combination drugs to be a strong factor in their reimbursement decision-making
process, while two payers did not value the compliance aspect of fixed dose combination drugs.
One of the payers indicated that they value going from a twice per day pill to once per day, but
that if a person can take two pills once per day then there is limited benefit to taking one pill
once per day. Please see Figure I1 for details.
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Figure 11: Relative Importance of Factors in Coverage
Decisions for Cardiovascular FDCs
(Example: "Outcomes Data" received one score of 2, one score of 3, and three scores of 5
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Please explain any differences in the coverage decisions around Caduet, Vytorin and
Exforge.
Four out of five payers had differing coverage for Caduet, Vytorin, and Exforge. Three out of the
four payers with varying coverage said the dominant reason for the differences in coverage is
related to price and contract. Respondents stated that the drug for which they could obtain the
lowest price through a discount based on their list price was placed on a favorable tier. However,
most of the payers stated that other factors have some influence on coverage, including
utilization data, physician demand, number of members taking the drug, and number of generics
in the class. One payer said they would strongly reconsider placing a drug on a higher tier if a
large percentage of their members were on the drug, because they do not want to disrupt the care
of their members.
Are the coverage decisions price related? To what level would a non-preferred drug have to
lower its price to obtain better coverage?
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All payers stated that price had a strong impact on their coverage decisions for these fixed dose
combination cardiovascular drugs. One payer does not cover any of the fixed dose combination
drugs because they value affordability and do not see any benefit in taking one pill once per day
rather than two pills once per day. Two payers stated that to obtain better coverage, the drug
would have to price at the level of its individual components or slightly lower because by having
members purchase one pill versus two they are losing a copay. Two other payers stated a non-
preferred drug would have to lower its price to the level of the competitor FDCs. One payer
stated it did not matter how low they priced the drug because there are too many generics
available in this therapy area.
What would the pharmaceutical company have to do to obtain better coverage?
Two payers stated that the only way to obtain better coverage would be to lower the price.
Another payer stated that the FDC would have to show improved efficacy and/or safety data
compared to its competitors, while a different payer stated if they were able to clinically
demonstrate increased compliance then they would consider offering the drug better coverage.
Finally, one payer stated there was nothing to be done because there are too many generics
available.
What influence do the following factors have on formulary decisions for each of the
following intravenous oncologics? Does your response vary by drug?
All payers said that the level of unmet need in a therapy area was a very important factor in the
decision-making process for intravenous oncologics. Additionally, time to progression, overall
survival, control of symptoms, and side effects were given a score of four or five by all payers.
Most payers thought physician and patient demand played a role in their coverage decision-
making process, but not a strong one. Four out of five payers said that contracting was not a
factor for this therapy area, because the pharmaceutical companies would not offer a price lower
than their list price for this class of drugs. However, one payer gave contracting a score of five,
indicating that this payer did have contracts with pharmaceutical companies for at least one of
these drugs.
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Payers were split on the level of importance of public policies. Public policies include factors
such as oncology being one of Medicare's six protected classes and state mandates that require
payers to cover oncology drugs for all possible indications. Some states require payers to cover
all uses of oncologics including off-label use, while others only require coverage of oncologics
for FDA approved indications. As a result, regional payers in states with oncology coverage
mandates ranked the importance of public policies as very important, as did payers whose
member population is predominantly Medicare patients. However, payers in states without
oncology mandates and with a predominantly commercial membership make-up did not feel that
public policies played any part in their coverage decision-making process for oncologics.
There was a wide range of responses regarding the importance of list price in the coverage
decision-making process. Two payers stated that list price did not factor into their decision-
making process because they are already mandated to cover all of these drugs due to certain
public policies. Two other payers stated that list price was important in the decision-making
process, but not as important as other factors such as overall survival and time to progression
data. One payer stated that list price was very important in their coverage decision-making
process, because given efficacy and safety equivalency, they work with their physicians to
promote the use of the most cost-effective drugs in oncology. Figure 12 presents the detailed
ratings for IV oncologics.
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Figure 12: Relative Importance of Factors in Coverage
Decisions for Intravenous Oncologics
(Example: "Time to Progression" received one score of 4 and four scores of 5
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Please explain any differences in the coverage decisions around Provenge, Avastin, Erbitux,
and Vectibix.
All of these drugs are covered under the medical benefit, so there is no variance in co-payment or
co-insurance for these drugs. The only variance in coverage of these drugs were which ones
require prior authorizations checking that the drug is being used for an FDA approved indication
or for an indication for which there is data indicating its efficacy. Only two payers have a
variance in the coverage of these drugs. The rationale was that the payers were in the process of
implementing prior authorizations for all of these drugs, but they started with the ones for which
they were most concerned about off-label use.
Are the coverage decisions price related? To what level would a non-preferred drug have to
lower its price to obtain better coverage?
Three payers said that price played little to no role in the coverage decision-making process due
to public policies mandating they cover all drugs in this class. One payer said that price plays an
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indirect role in their coverage decision-making process. For a drug with a high prevalence, the
payer may require a prior authorization to make sure there is no leakage or inappropriate use.
List price has an indirect effect because it affects the overall cost.
In contrast, one payer stated that list price plays an important role in their coverage decision-
making process. If a new cancer agent launches into a therapy area with no other treatment
options, then this payer will cover the drug regardless of the list price or contract. However, all
things being equal, the payer is working with their oncologists to create and follow cost-
effectiveness guidelines. Over the past five years they have started making active comparisons
for therapy areas with more than one oncologic option. The recent implementation of electronic
health records has allowed them to do these analyses. They can compare overall survival for
various treatment pathways, and if there is no difference they can recommend the least costly
treatment pathway.
What would the pharmaceutical company have to do to obtain better coverage?
Besides the one payer which is issuing guidelines recommending the most cost-effective
treatment pathway, all the payers stated there was nothing pharmaceutical companies could do to
obtain better coverage because all of the oncologics are already covered for all FDA indications.
Summary of Interviews with Oncologic Distributor
The oncologic distributor interviewed has a network of about 3,000 oncologists for which they
distribute drugs. For approximately 1,000 of these physicians, the distributor also manages the
physician office's IT, billing, and other back office operations. The bulk of the distributor's
revenue (70-80%) derives from drug distribution and managing physicians' offices, while the
rest of its revenue comes from research and other partnerships with pharmaceutical companies.
Their network of physicians is growing by 5-10% per year. When searching for growth
opportunities, the distributor looks for practices that are independent, have evidence-based
practices, and are growth oriented. The distributor's network is predominantly in the South,
Midwest, and West, and located in smaller cities that are not dominated by teaching hospitals.
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In response to physicians' concerns that they could not sustain their business given the escalating
costs for therapeutics, the distributor created a set of guidelines about six years ago with the goal
of decreasing costs while maintaining strong outcomes data. The guidelines are evidence-based,
cost-effective treatment paradigms specific for different types of cancer.
When creating a new treatment guideline, the distributor uses the decision tree in Figure 13 to
decide whether to include a drug in the guidelines. Efficacy and toxicity equivalency decisions
are made by the distributor's pharmacy and therapeutics committee, which is composed entirely
of in-network physicians. When making efficacy decisions, overall survival data is considered
the gold standard. Convenience is not taken into account specifically at any point in the process.
Once a treatment guideline is created, it is sent to all of the physicians in the network prior to
implementation. Individual physicians have the opportunity to vote and/or suggest changes.
Figure 13: Oncologics Distributor's Process for the
Creation of Oncology Treatment Guidelines
1) Do all treatment otions Yes
have the same efficacy?
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2) Do all tYeeatments hase the
Samle level of toxicity? f
No
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At this point, the distributor has created 19-23 treatment guidelines for different types of cancer,
which account for -90% of all cancer patients. Each physician practice has the choice of opting
into using the treatment guidelines. However, the physician practice must be fully managed by
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the distributor for guidelines to be implemented, because the guidelines require the distributor's
IT system. Eighty-five to ninety percent of the distributor's 1,000 fully-managed physician
practices have opted into using the cost-effective guidelines. For these practices, the distributor
has a compliance rate with the guidelines of -80%.
The guidelines are built into the physician office's IT system, which is managed by the
distributor. When an oncologist enters information about a patient into the system, three items
appear:
1) Research papers discussing the various treatment regimens,
2) Clinical trial research on each of the possible treatment regimens, and
3) The distributor's guidelines' choice of treatment regimen.
Compliance with the guidelines is independently regulated by each individual physician practice.
Some practices have implemented a process that requires physicians to send an email to the head
of their physician practice if they choose a different regimen than the guidelines recommend.
Pharmaceutical companies have absolutely no influence on the treatment guidelines. The
distributor does not contract with pharmaceutical companies to gain better access.
Pharmaceutical companies do not provide any research papers when the distributor is deciding
on the guidelines. Pharmaceutical companies do not know whether their product is included in
the guidelines. The cost-effective treatment guidelines are kept highly confidential.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
With this study, we examined the role pricing plays in the insurance coverage of pharmaceuticals
in the U.S. Initially, we performed significant background research on the reimbursement
structure for various formulations of pharmaceuticals. Based on this research, we decided to
choose three fixed dosed combination cardiovascular drugs and four intravenous oncology drugs
to examine further. These two classes were chosen because they differ in a fundamental way.
The FDC cardiovascular drugs are covered by the pharmacy benefit provisions of healthcare
plans and are in a less politically sensitive therapeutic area, while the intravenous oncologics are
covered under the medical benefit provisions of healthcare plans and are a highly political class
of drugs. Thus, we can determine if price plays a role in widely varying classes of drugs, or if the
role of price varies by therapeutic class.
Initially, we used public sources to determine the price of our select drugs. The Red Book 2012
provides the list price of drugs by number of pills (e.g. a 30 pill container) and by bag size (e.g. a
15 ml bag or a 100 ml bag). Then, for each of the oncologics, we performed some additional
calculations using the prescribing information for each drug to determine the approximate
number of bags an average male would receive, thus controlling for different dosing. This was
not necessary for the FDCs as each of these drugs are dosed at one pill per day independent of
patient body mass. Next, we used Medicare's online Formulary Finder to determine the tier
coverage of the select FDCs. We were unable to do this for the oncologics as they are
predominantly covered under Part B, and thus, their coverage information is not publicly
available. The Formulary Finder data showed that Caduet, the most expensive of the select
FDCs, has the most restricted coverage of the three drugs suggesting that price may play a large
role in the coverage decision-making process for these drugs.
To evaluate the role of price further, we interviewed five payers about their coverage decision-
making process for our select FDCs and oncologics. Unanimously, all five payers said that
pricing and contracting play a very important role in coverage decisions for FDCs. However,
they said that coverage decisions for oncologics were more complicated and involved numerous
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other factors besides price, and that price did not play as important of a role in coverage
decisions.
Our hypothesis that the relatively high list prices of Caduet, Provenge, and Avastin would result
in greater access restrictions and that price is the driving factor that has caused payers to provide
relatively restricted coverage is partially correct. For Caduet, our results indicate that its
relatively high list price is in fact the driving factor for its greater access restrictions compared to
other cardiovascular FDCs. However, for Provenge and Avastin, not only is price not a driving
factor in coverage decisions, but also these drugs do not have greater access restrictions in
comparison to other oncologics. This is partially due to the reimbursement system for
intravenous oncologics and partially because numerous other factors play a more important role
in the decision-making process for oncologics.
Impact of Price for Fixed Dose Combination Cardiovascular Drugs
Our results imply that price plays a very important role in coverage decisions for fixed dose
cardiovascular drugs. Our results also show that contracting is equally important in this class. All
payers said that pricing and contracting go hand-in-hand for this class of drugs. Interestingly, the
importance to payers of FDCs pricing and contracting poses a challenge for pharmaceutical
companies with respect to optimizing their revenue potential.
In theory, pharmaceutical companies could maintain a high list price and then contract to a price
which is lower than competitors. This would be one strategy for optimizing revenue since some
payers may not need as steep of a contract as others to give the drug preferred access. However,
this strategy is more difficult to manage as it requires the pharmaceutical company to negotiate a
customized contract with every single payer rather than simply referring to the list price. The
financial gains and losses for this strategy would have to be evaluated by each pharmaceutical
company before deciding on an approach.
Payers mentioned other contracting strategies rather than simply a price rebate that are used by
pharmaceutical companies in this class. One strategy is bundling. Bundling occurs when a
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pharmaceutical company contracts for improved access of more than one drug at a time. For
example, I will give you a 20% reduction in price if you put both Caduet and Lipitor on Tier 2.
This allows large pharmaceutical companies to take advantage of their large portfolio of
products.
Whether pharmaceutical companies should even contract at all for this class of drugs is
questionable. Caduet appears to have very limited access - 80% of the plans we looked at
through Formulary Finder did not cover Caduet at all, precluding members from any access. In
this case, Pfizer, the manufacturer of Caduet, might consider contracting to be able to obtain a
minimal form of access. However, when we spoke with payers, most of them indicated that
Caduet's price would have to be severely reduced. On the other hand, Vytorin does not have as
good access as Exforge, but it is on the formulary for most of the payers. Merck would have to
analyze whether lowering Vytorin's price to obtain better access would result in enough
increased sales to compensate for the price reduction. The reduction in price may not be worth
the extra utilization.
In general, the payers we spoke with did not view fixed dose combination drugs positively. One
payer does not cover any of the FDCs because their company does not see any added value in
them. They do not believe in the compliance argument, and believe that FDCs are often
contrived and merely life-style drugs. Another issue that payers have with FDCs is that they
potentially expand the patient pool without an additional copayment in that patients who would
normally be on just one of the drugs in the FDC end up taking both. One payer mentioned that to
obtain better coverage for an FDC, the pharmaceutical company would have to lower its price
below that of the two individual components to incorporate the loss of the copayment. Finally,
payers understood that FDCs are generally a strategy to increase a drug's patent life and maintain
a relatively high price point. Thus, while the payers we spoke with tended to discourage use of
the cardiovascular FDCs for cost reasons, they had other grounds for concern as well.
The fixed dose combination cardiovascular drugs were intended to model a therapeutic area
where the products are considered to have minimal advantages over competitors and generics are
available. Extrapolating from our results would imply that in other therapeutic areas, such as
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diuretics and asthma drugs, where generics are available and where there are minimal perceived
advantages between products, pricing and contracting play strong roles in the determination of
coverage of the products. Payers' generally negative attitude toward FDCs would likely come
into play as well. This should be confirmed with further studies.
Impact of Price for Intravenous Oncologics
Contrary to our hypothesis, our results show that price plays a very limited role in coverage
decisions for intravenous oncologics. The only impact that payers stated price played for these
drugs was in determining which drugs should be subject to prior authorization. Payers place prior
authorizations on the drugs with the highest price to make sure the product is being used for an
appropriate use, since overall cost to the company is impacted by the combination of price and
utilization, including off-label use.
Interestingly, although payers ranked efficacy for intravenous oncologics very high, they stated
that better or worse efficacy would not impact the coverage of these drugs as long as the drug is
FDA approved. For some of these drugs, payers do require patients to take the accompanying
diagnostic to show that the drug will most likely be effective (e.g. Vectibix and Erbitux). But
their coverage of intravenous oncologics does not strongly depend on how effective the drug is
as long as it is FDA approved.
In general, payers stated two reasons why price and efficacy do not play a significant role in
reimbursement decisions for these drugs. First, there are many other factors, such as public
policies and unmet need, which come into play for this class of drugs. Second, payers lack the
tools and ability to guide members to other treatments for this class of drugs because they are
covered under the medical benefit / Part B.
Many states have mandates to cover all FDA approved indications for oncologics. Some states
such as Connecticut even mandate that payers cover all off-label use of oncology drugs. 30 This
prevents payers from simply not covering a drug due to efficacy or safety concerns. Additionally,
this prevents payers from dissuading drug companies from pricing high because payers are
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precluded from not covering the drug or putting significant access restrictions on it. Several
states, such as New York, Vermont, and Maine, are passing laws which put limits on the co-
payments and co-insurance amounts payers and healthcare plans can place on drugs. The goals
of these laws are to protect patients from very high out-of-pocket costs. Interestingly,
pharmaceutical companies such as Pfizer are avidly supporting these laws. They are even
offering to draft the legislative language. According to Sharon Treat, executive director of the
National Legislative Association on Prescription Drug Prices, these laws give "the drug
companies a free ride to charge as much as they want."31 Currently, high out-of-pocket costs is
the only tool that payers have to dissuade drug companies from pricing their oncology drugs
high. The out-of-pocket cost is meant to dissuade members from using the drugs unnecessarily,
and thus, would lower the drug's overall utilization and the revenue for the pharmaceutical
companies. Although these new laws protect patients from significant out-of-pocket costs, they
eliminate the one tool payers can use to dissuade pharmaceutical companies from pricing their
oncology drugs so relatively high. Oncology being one of Medicare's six protected classes has a
similar effect.
Payers have difficulty managing drugs covered under the medical benefit / Part B due to the
structure of the healthcare system. Unlike the pharmacy benefit, there are no out-of-pocket tiers
for medical benefit drugs, nor step edits because the medical benefit drugs are not distributed at
retail pharmacies. The only tools that payers have are prior authorizations and co-insurance.
Prior authorizations are difficult for payers to enforce due to the structure of the system. Thus,
payers have no method to give more efficacious drugs preferred access. Under the current
system, physicians first purchase the drug from a distributor, then give the drug to the patient,
and then finally bill the patient's insurance company. By the time the physician bills the
insurance company, he/she has already given the patient the drug, making it difficult for payers
to deny reimbursement for that drug. As a result, prior authorizations are difficult to enforce and
require payers to make sure their in-network physicians are well versed in the prior authorization
requirements for every drug.
The out-of-pocket amount for drugs with a co-insurance does vary with the price of the drug.
The higher the list price of the drug, the larger the out-of-pocket cost. However, since almost all
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plans have an annual out-of-pocket limit, members taking oncologics usually reach this limit
within the first few months of treatment. Once a member reaches their out-of-pocket limit, the
effects of having a co-insurance on a drug is negated. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, many
states are passing laws that limit payers' abilities to place co-insurances on these drugs. Thus,
with the current structure of the healthcare system, payers have minimal ability to curb drug
costs for intravenous oncologics. By inference, this is true for all drugs covered under the
medical benefit.
The structure of the medical benefit / Part B also prevents payers from giving preferential access
to drugs with better efficacy because all of the drugs have the same co-insurance level. Thus, an
intravenous drug with improved efficacy would have the same level of coverage as a less-
effective drug. This structure leaves the differentiation of efficacy predominantly up to the
physician. With this structure, physicians and patients are not incentivized to use one drug over
the other as they are with drugs covered under the pharmacy benefit / Part D. However, there are
oncology distributors that use efficacy to determine access to a drug. The oncology distributor
we spoke with indicated that the first determinant of whether a drug will be included in their
treatment guidelines was efficacy. If the drug showed improved efficacy, then it would be the
recommended product regardless of price and other factors.
Evolving Landscape ofDrug Management
Although we did not focus on new techniques payers are using to attempt to control rising drug
costs, payers mentioned several of them during our interviews. Two of the emerging strategies to
control costs are the use of specialty pharmacies and the role of certain oncologic drug
distributors. In some cases payers are collaborating with the specialty pharmacies and
distributors to control costs. In other cases, the specialty pharmacies and distributors are working
independently.
Specialty pharmacies are organizations that provide access to, and support for, most out-patient
intravenous and injectable products that have relatively high acquisition costs and are difficult to
manage. Specialty pharmacies act as an intermediary between physicians and payers for these
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products. They handle the inventory and sourcing of the drugs for the physicians so that
physicians no longer have to worry about stocking the intravenous and injectable drugs
themselves. By billing the payer for reimbursement on behalf of the physician, the specialty
pharmacies also take care of making sure that all prior authorizations issued by payers are
followed before the drug is given to the physician.36 Some payers are considering mandating that
physicians obtain their oncologics via their specialty pharmacy. WellPoint, for example, has its
own in-house specialty pharmacy. WellPoint's chief pharmacy officer, Brian Sweet, has stated
that their goal with their specialty pharmacy is to be able to utilize "the same formulary
management and utilization management techniques that we've done in pharmacy, and putting
them in the medical benefit."2 1 The increased use of specialty pharmacies by payers will increase
their ability to manage drugs covered under the medical benefit.
US Oncology is an oncology drug distributor to physicians. The company also manages over
1,200 physicians' back office needs such as billing and electronic health records. In collaboration
with their physicians, US Oncology has developed "Level I Pathways" for treating non-small cell
lung cancer and colorectal cancer. The goal of the program is to steer physicians to treatment
options that provide maximal survival benefit, minimal toxicities, and cost-savings opportunities.
They have conducted studies with non-small cell lung cancer and colorectal cancer patients
demonstrating that their "Level I Pathways" result in no decrease in overall survival, but a
significant decrease in the overall cost of care. As a result, the "Level I Pathways" guidelines
have been adopted by over 80% of physician practices in US Oncology's network.37 '3" This is an
example of how a drug distributor is playing a role in curtailing drug costs. US Oncology is not
owned by a payer. However, US Oncology is a unique organization in that it is both a drug
distributor and physician office manager. Most drug distributors do not manage their physician's
electronic health records systems. Although there are few other companies with a similar
business model to US Oncology, this is a possible mechanism that payers or other third party
organizations could use to control the cost of intravenous oncologics.
Outside of the United States, different methods are used to control costs. The United Kingdom
uses the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) to determine which drugs
should be covered by its National Health Services (NHS). For new drugs, NICE develops and
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publishes clinical guidelines, which incorporate both efficacy and cost. NICE uses quality-
adjusted life years (QALYs) to measure the health benefits delivered by a given treatment
regime. As a guideline, NICE accepts as cost effective those interventions with an incremental
cost-effectiveness ratio of less than E20,000 per QALY. NICE requires increasingly strong
reasons for accepting as cost effective interventions with an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio
over a threshold of E30,000 per QALY.32 Both Avastin and Vectibix did not meet NICE's cost-
effectiveness threshold and thus, are not covered by NHS. 33 Germany has sickness funds which
act as budgets from which physicians draw to treat patients. All German citizens with incomes
below roughly $60,000 are required to enroll in one of approximately 250 sickness funds. Those
with higher incomes may enroll in the funds if they wish, or may opt out of the government
system. The costs of drugs are paid by the sickness funds. Thus, the physician is dissuaded from
prescribing costly products as they are on a fixed budget. 34 Finally, in France new drugs are
assigned an ASMR rating of I to V based entirely on efficacy data, where an ASMR rating of I
represents a major improvement over existing therapies and an ASMR rating of V represents no
improvement over existing therapies. Based on the ASMR rating, a price is negotiated with the
pharmaceutical manufacturers. Sometimes price/volume agreements are put in place, where if
the drug exceeds a certain volume of use, rebates kick-in and the drug company is forced to
lower its price.35 These are simply a few examples of how other countries are attempting to
control increasing drug prices.
Future Research
Our discussions with payers and our analysis of the pricing and reimbursement issues involved
with FDC cardiovascular drugs and intravenous oncologics offer significant implications for
future research. This study looked at the issues of pricing and reimbursement from a qualitative,
broad perspective, given there has been little research previously conducted surrounding
reimbursement decisions and the variances in coverage decision-making processes. There are
numerous preliminary learnings from this study which should be explored further.
Increasing the number of payers interviewed to expand the sample size to the level of
mathematical significance would be beneficial. Although this study was able to reach just under
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50 million covered pharmacy/Part D lives and just fewer than 100 million covered medical/Part
B lives, the support of the findings would be increased by interviewing additional payers. This
would also allow for analysis of regional differences in the decision-making process. This study
has shown that coverage of oncologics is strongly impacted by the presence of state mandates for
coverage of these drugs. Understanding which regions have a strong local impact on coverage
decisions would be beneficial.
This study began to explore the role of other healthcare organizations outside of payers in
deterring pharmaceutical companies from pricing their products too high. There have been very
few studies conducted on the role of drug distributors regarding drug access. Interviewing
additional drug distributors and analyzing how they are managing their oncology pricing would
be worthwhile. Understanding if other oncologic distributors have the infrastructure in place to
manage oncologic usage and if their decision-making process regarding drug coverage differs
from that of payers are important factors to understand. We briefly touched on the emerging role
of in-house specialty pharmacies. However, we did not explore the impact of independent
specialty pharmacies, and their impact on patient access to drugs and what role pricing plays in
their decision-making process. Are there other organizations attempting to control drug
spending?
Finally, a key opportunity to further validate the implications suggested by this thesis would
involve exploring the rationale behind the coverage decision-making process for drugs in other
therapeutic areas. Some possible therapy areas are diabetes and asthma drugs, as each of these
have both branded and generic drugs with comparable efficacy. Other interesting therapy areas
may be anti-psychotics and anti-epileptic drugs, since these classes of drugs are each one of
Medicare's six protected classes, but the products are covered under the pharmacy benefit.
Lastly, this thesis did not explore the management of drugs predominantly administered within a
hospital such as branded anti-biotics.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions
Our results show that price plays an important role in the coverage decision-making process only
for certain therapeutic classes. The two therapeutic areas chosen had widely different roles for
price in the decision-making process. Other factors also played different roles in the coverage
decision-making process for these two classes. Additionally, our research highlighted the stark
difference in payers' abilities to manage drugs covered under the pharmacy benefit / Part D
versus those covered under the medical benefit / Part B. Specifically, the ability to manage drugs
under the medical benefit / Part B is significantly less than the ability to manage drugs under the
pharmacy benefit / Part D. This difference diminishes the impact that price and efficacy have
over the coverage of intravenous drugs, since payers are severely limited in their ability to grant
more efficacious or less expensive drugs preferential access if they are covered under the
medical benefit / Part B. However, there are emerging organizations and techniques that may
change payers' ability to manage these drugs as well as change the role of price with respect to
patient access to medical benefit / Part B drugs. Thus, our research has several implications for
the management of pharmaceuticals and the role of price in their management.
Implications
1) List price and contracting play an important role in classes of drugs which are covered
under the pharmacy benefit / Part D, and where there are minimal perceived advantages
between the drugs.
2) List price and contracting play less important roles for classes of drugs covered under the
medical benefit / Part B.
3) Improved efficacy for intravenous drugs covered under the medical benefit / Part B does
not correlate with improved access because payers are unable to differentiate access to
the medical benefit / Part B drugs.
4) Public policy and unmet need are important factors driving coverage decisions for
oncology drugs.
5) Currently, payers have minimal to no tools available for them to manage drugs covered
under the medical benefit / Part B.
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6) Pharmaceutical companies support public policies mandating coverage of classes of
drugs or limiting the out-of-pocket costs because it allows them to price these drugs
without having to factor in payers possibly not covering the drug or passing on a
significant part of the drug's cost to the patient.
7) Drugs entering therapeutic areas with no other treatment options have greater pricing
liberties.
8) Although the coverage decision-making process is similar across payers, the specific
weighting of the various factors that go into the process may vary.
9) Regional differences can have an impact on the coverage decision-making process for
some therapeutic areas.
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Appendix A: Medicare Formularies Represented
National Plans
* United Healthcare
" Aetna
* Health Net
" CIGNA
" Humana
" WellCare
* WellPoint
Regional Plans
" Blue Shield of California
* Blue Cross Blue Shield of Texas
* Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois
* Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Mexico
* Blue Cross Blue Shield of Oklahoma
* Blue Cross Blue Shield of Florida
* Blue Cross Blue Shield of Georgia
e Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts
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